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SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS AND THE ONE CLASS OF STOCK REQumiEMNT:
SHOULD DEBT EvER BE RECLASSIFIED As A DISQUALIFYING SECOND CLASS OF
STOCK?
Under the rules of Subchapter C, of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
which govern the taxation of most corporations, numerous tax benefits
attach to the use of shareholder held debt rather than equity.' These ad-
vantages have encouraged shareholders to make their contributions to the
risk capital of the business in the form of loans. In order to forestall such
tax avoidance schemes, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the
courts have frequently chosen to reclassify as equity those shareholder
contributions which do not represent bona fide debt.2 Fewer tax benefits
accrue from the use of shareholder debt under the Subchapter S provisions
of the Code,3 which provide an alternative method of taxation for certain
eligible small business corporations. Nevertheless, the Commissioner has
applied the doctrine of debt reclassification in this sphere with vengeance,
employing the doctrine to create a second class of stock which revokes the
offending corporation's Subchapter S election. This Note will examine the
proper function of debt reclassification under Subchapter S.
I. TAXATION OF SUBCHAPrER S CORPORATIONS IN GENERAL
Under sections 1371 through 1378 of the Internal Revenue Code, certain
"small business corporations"' may elect to avoid taxation at the corporate
level,5 provided that the corporate income and loss are reported by the
individual shareholders in relation to their proportionate stock ownership.6
To be eligible for such treatment, a corporation must meet certain qualifi-
cations. It must be a domestic corporation which is not a member of an
affiliated group 8 and which has no more than ten shareholders,' all of whom
I The corporate and shareholder advantages and disadvantages of debt financing have been
considered in Caplin, The Calorie Count of a Thin Incorporation, 43 MaQ. L. Rnv. 31 (1959);
Schlesinger, "Thin" Incorporations: Income Tax Advantages and Pitfalls, 61 HARv. L. Rav.
50 (1947).
2 For an exhaustive list of cases concerning the various facets of the doctrine of debt
reclassification, see M. LORE, TmN CAPrrALZA7TON, 33-162 (1958); Caplin, supra note 1.
3 Technical Amendment Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64, 72 Stat. 1606, amending
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 (codified at INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-77).
r INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a). Although section 1371 denominates an eligible corpo-
ration as a "small business corporation," there is no limitation upon the amount of the capital
of the qualifying company.
5 Subchater S does, however, impose a capital gains tax at the corporate level in certain
circumstances. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1378.
' Although the general outlines may be similar, the taxable status of a Subchapter S
corporation differs greatly from that accorded to partnerships. See B. Brrrnaa & J. EusnmcE,
FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARFoLDERs 711 (2d ed. 1966); Caplin,
Subchapter S vs. Partnership: A Proposed Legislative Program, 46 VA. L. Rav. 61 (1960).
INT. Rgv CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a).
Id. The term "affiliated group" is defined in INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1504.
r INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a)(1).
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must be individuals or estates'0 and none of whom may be a nonresident
alien." The corporation may not derive more than eighty per cent of its
gross income from foreign sources'" and no more than twenty per cent of
its gross income may be passive investment income.'3 All shareholders
must consent to the election, either before the end of the first month of
the first taxable year'4 or within thirty days of the date on which they
become shareholders.' 5 Finally, the corporation must not have more than
one class of stock.'6
The general principle governing taxation under Subchapter S is that
operating gains and losses 7 are "passed through" the corporation and
taxed directly to the shareholders on a pro rata basis according to their
stockholdings." Specifically, each shareholder must include in his gross
income the amount of current earnings and profits that are actually dis-
tributed to him. This amount constitutes an actual dividend. Since there
is no taxation on the income at the corporate level under Subchapter S, a
major concern is the taxation of that corporate income which is not ac-
tually distributed to the shareholders. Thus each shareholder must include
in his gross income his share of the corporation's undistributed taxable
income (UTI) which would have been a dividend if it had been distributed
on the last day of the corporation's taxable year.2" This amount constitutes
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a)(2).
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a).
,2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(e)(4).
I5 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a)(5).
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(c).
,I TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(e). The election must be made during the first month of
the year to which it applies or during the preceding month. NT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 1372(e)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-2(b) (1959). Once the election has been made, however,
it continues in effect for all succeeding years unless some subsequent event terminates the
election. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1372(d), (e). This termination may be either intentional
or inadvertent. The corporation may not re-elect after such an event without the Commis-
sioner's consent until five years have elapsed. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(f).
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a)(4).
': The taxable income of a Subchapter S corporation is computed in the normal manner,
except that no deductions are allowed for net operating losses under section 172 or for any
other of the special corporate deductions listed in sections 241-47. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 1373(d).
11 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1373(b), 1374(c). When passed through to the shareholder,
taxable income, with one exception, does not retain the characteristics it possessed in the
hands of the corporation. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1373(b). The one exception is that,
under section 1375(a), the excess of the corporation's net long-term capital gain over its short-
term capital loss is passed through as such to the shareholders. But cf. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 1378.
9 The distribution must qualify as a dividend under section 316 before the shareholder will
be taxed at ordinary rates. If there were no earnings and profits from which the distribution
could be made, the distribution will be covered by the provisions of section 301.
21 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1373(b); cf. TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1375(f). The corpora.
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a constructive dividend. The amount of the UTI which has been taxed to
the shareholder is credited to his account as previously taxed income
(PTI),21 and the basis of his stock is increased by that amount.? For exam-
ple, if shareholder A owns one-third of the outstanding stock of Corpora-
tion X at the end of the taxable year and Corporation X has $30,000 of UTI
for that year, then A must include $10,000 income on his individual return
as his share of the UTI. A's basis in the stock is thereby increased by
$10,000. The same results would be achieved if the corporation had paid
A an actual dividend of $10,000 andA immediately reinvested that amount
in the corporation as a contribution to capital. Thus the amount is deemed
constructively distributed and reinvested as a capital contribution.?
Since the shareholder has already been taxed on the undistributed in-
come in his PTI account, he is permitted to receive that amount from this
account without the payment of further taxes. 2' Money distributions dur-
ing the first two and one-half months of the taxable year are deemed to
reduce UTI of the previous taxable year.? All amounts distributed after
the first two and one-half months are first allocated to current earnings and
profits. Thus these distributions must first exceed current earnings and
profits before the PTI account can be reduced..28 Since the shareholder's
basis in his stock was increased by amounts credited to his PTI account,"
any PTI distribution will correspondingly reduce the basis at which the
stock is held.
For tax purposes, perhaps the most significant difference between Sub-
tion's taxable income is calculated in the same manner as for Subchapter C corporations
except that no net operating loss deductions are carried over. NrIr. Rcy. CODE OF 1954,
§ 1373(d); see Rev. Rul. 70-306, 1970-1 Cum. BuLL. 179. UTI is determined by subtracting
from taxable income the amount of actual dividends distributed in cash. Distributions in kind
do not reduce UTI, but they may reduce earnings and profits. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(e)
(1959) which provides that earnings and profits are first allocated to actual dividends paid
in cash with any excess being allocated ratably to UTI and actual dividends paid in property
other than money.
21 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1375(d). Each individual shareholder has his own personal PTI
account representing prior taxable corporate income which he has reported in his own individ-
ual return and on which he has paid the appropriate tax. This PTI account is personal to the
original shareholder. It is not an account attributable to the shares of stock themselves and
thus it cannot be transferred even though the stock is subsequently transferred. Any later
distribution to the original shareholder out of his PTI account will not be taxable to that
shareholder. Id.
= INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1376(a).
See Caplin, Subchapter S and its Effect on the Capitalization of Corporations, 13 VAD.
L. REv. 185, 188 (1959).
21 Distributions in kind do not come from PTI. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(b) (1959).
2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1375(0. Such distributions are not considered as dividends,
and the earnings and profits of the corporation are not reduced by reason of such distribu-
tions. Id.
' See Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(d) (1959).
z See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
1973]
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chapter C and Subchapter S corporations is the treatment of net operating
losses. In the Subchapter C context there is no direct effect on the share-
holder's income when the corporation suffers losses.2s In Subchapter S
corporations, however, the corporation's net operating loss is "passed
through" directly to the individual shareholders as an ordinary loss. 2 The
shareholder's portion of the loss is determined on a pro rata basis attributa-
ble on that pro rata basis to the shares held by him on each day of the
taxable year. 0 For example, if the shareholder owned ten per cent of the
corporation's stock for six months of the taxable year, his portion of the
net operating loss would be five per cent." The taxpayer, then, may utilize
this loss deduction to offset any income he may have had from outside
sources. The taxpayer may carry the loss back and forward to other tax
years.32
The shareholder's use of this net operating loss deduction does, however,
have one important limitation. A shareholder may not deduct an amount
in excess of the basis in his stock plus the basis in any indebtedness which
the corporation may owe to the shareholder." Thus, if a shareholder's
portion of the net operating loss amounts to $50,000, but his adjusted basis
in stock and indebtedness3 is only $25,000, the excess $25,000 may not be
deducted. The excess loss may not be carried over to a subsequent year nor
back to a prior year, and thus the use of that loss may be lost to him
forever.3
The foregoing is an outline of the general provisions for taxation of Sub-
chapter S corporations. The obvious major advantages of Subchapter S tax
treatment are the elimination of the double-taxation aspects of corporate
income distributed as dividends,3 the elimination of the threat of the
penalty tax on accumulated earnings, 3 the elimination of the threat of
personal holding company taxes,u and, perhaps most advantageous, the
11 Such losses do, of course, have an indirect effect on the shareholders in that the fair mar-
market value of their stock is probably reduced. Upon sale or liquidation, the shareholder
might realize either less gain or more loss because of this reduced value.
INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1374(a), (b), (c)(1).
hr IT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1374(c).
, This differs from the determination of an individual's share of the UTI which is based
on the shareholder's stock ownership on the last day of the taxable year. See INT. REv. CoDE
OF 1954, § 1373(b).
"2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1374(d). See Treas. Reg. § 1.1374-2 (1959).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1374(c)(2).
The basis of any indebtedness is determined at the year's end without regard to any
adjustments for that taxable year. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1374(c)(2)(B).
See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1374(c)(2).
Sections 301 and 316 provide that shareholders be taxed at ordinary rates on any corpo-
rate distribution which qualifies as a dividend, even though the corporation may have already
paid a separate tax at the corporate rates.
'7 NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 531-37.
" INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 541-47.
[Vol. 8: 199
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availability of the net operating loss deduction to the shareholder.-
Subchapter S treatment may prove to be disadvantageous if the individ-
ual shareholders are in tax brackets with rates higher than the corporate
rate, especially if the corporate income is left in the corporation and not
distributed to the shareholders. Perhaps the most serious disadvantage of
the Subchapter S election lies in the possibility of inadvertent termination
of the election. The election may be terminated in any of the ways men-
tioned in section 1372(e). One of the bases for termination of the election
is the corporation's failure to meet the definitional requirements of an
electing small business corporation as set forth in section 1371(a)." Thus
the election may terminate, for example, if stock is sold or transferred to
an eleventh shareholder or if the corporation ceases to have only one class
of stock'.4
This inherent disadvantage becomes painfully obvious when at the end
of the taxable year it is determined that the Subchapter S status has been
lost at some time during the year. The result is the loss of the election for
the entire taxable year and instead of Subchapter S tax treatment, the
corporation is taxed as a conventional corporation. Thus tax is imposed at
the corporate level at the appropriate rate and all actual distributions
made during the year which qualify as dividends will be taxed to the
shareholders as such. Since the shareholders would have been unaware of
the termination, the dividend policy of the corporation would have been
based upon the assumption that there would be no such double taxation.
In cases involving high profits and a large distribution of dividends, the
resultant increase in tax could be disastrous. If the situation is such that
the termination is not brought to the shareholder's attention for several
years, the disastrous consequences naturally would be increased.
II. TM ONE CIASS OF STOCK REQIuREMEwNT AD DBT REcLASSIFiCATION
A. In General
The debt versus equity classification has been a major area of tax litiga-
tion in the case of conventional corporations.2 The reclassification problem
arose because corporations and shareholders were using the differences
between tax treatment of loans and equity contributions to avoid certain
taxes. The chief advantage to the corportion is that it can deduct the
interest on the indebtedness paid to the shareholder." Moreover, by using
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1374.
See notes 4-10 and accompanying text supra.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(3) (1959).
See generally B. BrrrKER & J. EusTrCE, FEDERAL INco, TEoAx .o OF CORPORATONS A D
SHAREHOLDERS, 4.02-.09 (3d ed. 1971).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163(a). If the corporation were able to classify equity contribu-
tions as debt obligations, then payments which should actually be dividends would be consid-
ered as interest payments and hence deductible by the corporation.
1973]
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debt securities rather than stock, the corporation can protect itself against
the accumulated earnings surtax" since the retention of earnings to retire
legitimate debt has been deemed a reasonable business purpose."
Historically, then, the debt versus equity classification problem arose in
cases of attempted tax avoidance. Thus the original body of litigation that
set the rules governing reclassification had as its sole purpose the preven-
tion of such tax avoidance.46 In each case, the result of the reclassification
was to deny the taxpayer the improper tax benefit sought in labelling the
obligation as debt rather than equity. It would therefore appear that in the
case of conventional corporations it would be improper to make such a
reclassification unless the taxpayer were mislabelling the form of his capi-
tal contribution in order to gain an improper tax benefit.
Reclassification in the Subchapter S context has a peculiar effect. In-
stead of merely denying the taxpayer the improper tax benefit, reclassifica-
tion operates to deny the taxpayer the entire benefit of being taxed as a
Subchapter S corporation.47 To terminate this benefit, proof should be
required that the use of debt abuses the very scheme of Subchapter S
taxation. However, to terminate the benefit pursuant to reclassification
under section 1371(a)(4) (which sets forth the one class of stock require-
ment) a showing that the use of debt frustrates the congressional purpose
behind that particular statute should be essential. Until recently," how-
ever, courts considering debt reclassification in the Subchapter S context
have failed to analyze the problem in this manner.
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 531.
See Gazette Tel. Co., 19 T.C. 692 (1953), aff'd, 209 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954).
Where, however, the debt is not bona fide, such accumulations will not be treated as part of
the "reasonable needs of the business." Cf. Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp., 15 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 418, 432 (1956), rev'd on other grounds, 241 F.2d 197 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 US.
922 (1957).
" Reclassification has been made in situations involving the following issues:
1. Whether payments by a corporation are deductible interest payments or nonde-
ductible dividends. Wilber Security Co., 31 T.C. 938, 948-52 (1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 657
(9th Cir. 1960).
2. Whether payments by a corporation are deductible as the cost of goods sold or
nondeductible dividends. Sherwood Memorial Garden, Inc., 42 T.C. 211 (1964).
3. Whether a corporation realizes income upon the cancellation of notes given by a
corporation to a shareholder in return for money advanced to the corporation. J.A.
Maurer, Inc., 30 T.C. 1273 (1958).
4. Whether shareholder advances to a corporation are to be considered bona fide
indebtedness for the purposes of the bad debt deduction of section 166. American -
LaFrance - Foamite Corp. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1960).
5. Whether amounts paid by a corporation to an investor are to be treated by him as
repayments of a bona fide loan or as dividends. Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956).
" See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1372 (c).
" See pp. 210-13 infra.
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B. The Development of Case Law
The early cases did not address- themselves to the question of whether
the alleged improper use of debt in any way thwarted the congressional
purpose of the one class of stock requirement. Section 1371(a)(4) states
only that an electing small business corporation may not "have more than
one class of stock." The Treasury Department implemented this require-
ment through a regulation which stated in part:
If the outstanding shares of stock of the corporation are not identical
with respect to the rights and interest which they convey in the con-
trol, profits, and assets of the corporation, the corporation is consid-
ered to have more than one class of stock . . . .If an instrument
purporting to be a debt obligation is actually stock, it will constitute
a second class of stock. 9
Courts were initially concerned only with formulating the tests to be ap-
plied in determining whether debt was "actually stock" under the original
regulation. Although validity of the regulation itself was not questioned,
there were a few early indications that the presence of a possibility for tax
avoidance might be an important consideration in the reclassification de-
termination.50
Despite the incentives for debt financing under Subchapter S, no chal-
lenge to such shareholder loans reached the courts until 1964. In Catalina
Homes, Inc.,51 the Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's revocation of the
corporation's election under Subchapter S on the ground that the extensive
shareholder loans constituted a second class of stock. In this case, the
corporate stock was completely controlled by two individuals. Frank Spano
owned fifty-one per cent and was voting trustee of a voting trust - owned
by other members of his family which owned fourteen per cent of the stock.
George Blackshaw owned one per cent and was voting trustee of the voting
trust which held the remaining thirty-four per cent. The initial capital
contribution represented by the stock was $10,000. In addition, Spano
loaned the corporation $45,500 on open account and Blackshaw loaned
$24,500 in the same manner.0 Furthermore, a shareholder's agreement
19 Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1960) (emphasis added), as amended, T.D. 6904, Treas.
Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1966).
See cases cited in Catalina Homes, Inc., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1361 n.5 (1964); Nassau
Lens Co. v. Commissioner, 308 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1962).
' 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1361 (1964).
The Commissioner also contended that the Subchapter S election should be revoked
because it had as shareholders persons who were not individuals. See D'r. Re. Cos o 1954,
§ 1371(a)(4). The court, however, in view of its determination on other issues felt it unneces-
sary to decide whether the voting trusts are to be considered as shareholders so as to disqualify
the corporation under section 1371(a)(4). 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1368.
m These advances were directly proportionate to the amount of stock controlled by
each-65 percent by Spano and 35 percent by Blackshaw. The court, nevertheless, placed no
1973] 205
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between Spano and Blackshaw provided that the loans would bear five per
cent interest payable at the discretion of the Board of Directors and that
dividends on the common stock could not be paid until the loans had been
repaid in full with interest.54
The Commissioner argued in the Tax Court that the standard criteria
developed in cases involving conventional corporations should be applied
to determine whether advances by a shareholder to his corporation were
true loans or whether they were in reality equity contributions." Although
the court recognized the significance that tax avoidance motives had
played in the development of these reclassification criteria,"0 reclassifica-
tion of the loans as equity was deemed necessary in this case because the
purported loans were not evidenced by any notes and carried no maturity
date,57 because the five per cent interest was payable only at the discretion
of the board of directors," and because the loans were made soon after
incorporation to supplement capital contributions which were obviously
inadequate to meet the reasonable needs of the business."
The taxpayer argued against this reclassification on the theory that
reclassification should only be ordered to eliminate any possible tax avoid-
ance. In particular, the corporation argued that it was not seeking interest
deductions in the place of nondeductible dividends since, under the applic-
able Subchapter S rules, the interest deductions would benefit neither the
great emphasis on this fact:
The existence of proportionality between the amount of shareholder advances and the
percent of stock owned by the shareholders is merely, in some circumstances, an
indication that the advances have, in fact, been placed at the risk of the business and
actually constitute capital contributions. Under the circumstances before us, It Is of
no significance -whether the advances by Spano and Blackshaw were proportionate to
their stockholdings; for [the Commissioner] has called our attention to other factors
indicating that their advances were placed at the risk of the business.
23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1367. See id. at 1367 n.7.
-1 Id. at 1362.
5 The name given to the instrument, if any, is not conclusive but is to be considered
along with the other facts. The presence or absence of a maturity date for the indebted-
ness, the right of the creditor to enforce the payment of principal and interest, partici-
pation in management, whether the creditor subordinates his debt to those of the other
corporate creditors, whether the corporation is adequately capitalized, identity of in-
terest between creditor and shareholder, whether the advance was made at the time
of the organization of the corporation, and the ability of the corporation to obtain loans
from outside sources are among the factors which, depending upon the context in
which they are found, may be indicative of whether the amounts advanced have been
placed at the risk of the business as capital or are genuine loans.
Id. at 1365. See generally Bravenec, The One Class of Stock Requirement of Subchapter
S-A Round Peg in a Pentagonal Hole, 6 HouSTO L. Rav. 215, 230-31 (1968).
5' 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1367.
5 Id. at 1365.
5'Id.
'/d. at 1366.
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corporation nor the shareholders." The court recognized that a motive to
avoid taxes is a prerequisite to debt reclassification, but said that the
corporation's argument failed to go far enough because there were other
possible tax benefits besides the interest deduction which the taxpayer had
failed to demonstrate were not motives in the loan designation.6 On this
point, however, the court's opinion stops short in that it fails to point out
a single element of tax avoidance resulting from labelling advances as debt
rather than equity in the Subchapter S context.2 The court failed to point
out any tax benefit which might be derived from the debt label-except,
of course, the obvious tax benefit of retention of Subchapter S status.
Once the debt had been reclassified as equity, the court moved to the
further question of whether the obligation constituted a disqualifying sec-
ond class of stock.1 It employed the first part of Regulation 1.1371-1(g)
which stated that a "difference as to voting rights, dividend rights, or
liquidation preferences of outstanding stock will disqualify a corpora-
tion."" Since the advances in question were preferred in that they were to
be paid before any dividends on the common stock, the court, relying on
the seemingly mandatory language of the regulation," concluded that the
advances did constitute a disqualifying second class of stock." The elec-
tion, therefore, was held invalidY
Recognizing the severe consequences"8 resulting from this application of
the regulation's automatic second class of stock rule, the Tax Court, in its
1966 decision in W. C. Gamman,9 rejected the regulation's rule and substi-
tuted a more flexible approach.
The taxpayers in Gammon had organized Century House,Inc. in 1959 for
the purpose of constructing a motel near the site of the proposed Seattle
World's Fair. Three shareholders capitalized the corporation by contribut-
Since there is no tax at the corporate level, the same amount of taxes would be paid
whether the amounts paid with respect to the shareholder advances were considered interest
or dividends. The shareholders of the corporation would receive these amounts and report
them as ordinary income whether such amounts be considered interest or dividends. Thus
the taxpayer contended that there was no element of tax avoidance in the designation of the
advances as loans. Id. at 1366-67.
11 Id. at 1367.
12 The court does refer to other issues in which the application of such reclassification
criteria has arisen; however, it fails to point out how any of these issues have special applica-
tion in the Subchapter S context. See note 46 supra.
23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1367.
s, Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1960).
61 "If an instrument purporting to be a debt obligation is actually stock, it will constitute
a second class of stock." Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1960), as amended, T.D. 604, Tress. Reg.
§ 1.1371-1(g) (1966).
"1 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1367-68.
Id. at 1368. Accord, Henderson v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 782 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
" See p. 203 supra. See generally Bravenec, supra note 55.
" 46 T.C. 1 (1966), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 1967 P-H Fn. TAXEs CrrATOR
56,339 (9th Cir. 1967).
1973]
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ing $600 for no par common stock and $28,000 for six per cent demand
notes. After the stock and debt securities of one of the shareholders were
redeemed, the corporation during the next three years obtained $700,000
in additional financing from outside sources. The venture soon became
unfavorable and the two shareholders were forced to make $250,000 in
additional loans, these loans being in equal amounts and evidenced by
demand notes. The shareholders had made no effort to force payment of
these obligations 0 when the corporation filed an election under Subchapter
S for 1961 and 1962 in order to pass through to its shareholders the losses
sustained in those years." The Commissioner, however, determined that
the loans were in fact a contribution to capital and therefore a second class
of stock which disqualified the corporate election and thereby disallowed
the taxpayer's deduction of the losses.72
The Tax Court,agreed with the Commissioner that the taxpayer's ad-
vances represented contributions to capital rather than bona fide loans.
The court felt that "the advances . . . were . . . placed at the risk of the
business '7 3 and in that sense represented equity capital. The court empha-
sized not only the high debt-equity ratio of the capital structure, but also
the fact that outside investors would not have loaned the corporation
money on the same terms as had the shareholders.74 The crucial question
before the court, however, was not whether the advances were debt or
equity, but rather whether they constituted a second class of stock. 5 Since
the advances were made pro rata by the shareholders, the court reasoned
that no change in the relative rights of the shareholders had occurred. 0 The
advances represented no more than additional contributions to capital
"which were in reality reflected in the value of the common stock already
held by petitioners."" As such, the court held that the advances did not
constitute a second class of stock even though they did represent equity
11 The corporation had from time to time issued new notes in exchange for the old in order
to avoid the running of the statute of limitations; however, the shareholders had waived all
interest payments and had made no effort to force payment. Id. at 4.
11 Id. at 5.
72 Id. at 6.
" Id. at 9.
7 Id. at 10.
7 Id. at 9.
7, [We must also look to the realities of the situation to determine whether the
instruments, even though they might represent equity capital, actually gave the hold-
ers thereof any rights and interests in the corporation different from that owned by the
holder: of the nominal stock. We do not think they did under the circumstances hero
present, because the advances were made and the notes were held by the shareholders
in direct proportion to their stockholdings .... [W]hatever preferences the notes





HeinOnline  -- 8 Ga. L. Rev. 208 1973-1974
SUBCHAPTER S
contributions. That part of Regulation 1.1371-1(g) which purported to
transform any disguised debt obligation into a second cass of stock was
held to be invalid.7 8
In the aftermath of the Gamman decision, the last sentence of the regu-
lation was changed to read:
Obligations which purport to represent debt but which actually rep-
resent equity capital will generally constitute a second class of stock.
However, if such purported debt obligations are owned solely by the
owners of the nominal stock of the corporation in substantially the
same proportion as they own such nominal stock such purported debt
obligations will be treated as contributions to capital rather than a
second class of stock.7
The Commissioner then limited his attack to situations involving dispro-
portionate loans. However, he failed to meet with significant success. For
example, in James L. Stinnett, Jr.,,, the Tax Court stated:
[]It is only reasonable to assume that the Congress did not intend
that debt owing to a stockholder of a Subchapter S corporation would
result in more than one class of stock under the thin-capitalization
doctrine. This is not to say that an instrument called a "note" may
not by its very terms be something else. However, where the instru-
ment is a simple installment note, wihout any incidents commonly
attributed to stock, it does not give rise to more than one class of
stock within the meaning of section 1371 merely because the debt
creates disproportionate rights among the shareholders to the assets
of the corporation.s
Thus the court held Regulation 1.1371-1(g) invalid as applied to the facts
of the case."
7 Id. at 8. Judge Drennen noted that, in limiting eligibility to those corporations wth a
single class of stock, Congress sought to achieve two purposes: to afford relief to businesses
which were comparable to partnerships and proprietorships, and to avoid the complexities
of passing corporate gains and losses through to stockholders with different rights. See S. REP.
No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 146 (1964). Nothing in this legislative intent was deemed to
warrant a per se rule that all ostensible debt which is actually equity capital should be
classified as a second class of stock. 46 T.C. at 8.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1966) (emphasis added).
The proportionality rule has been rejected in a number of cases. See, e.g., Amory Cotton
Oil Co. v. United States, 468 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1972); Shores Realty Co. v. United States,
468 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1972); James L. Stinnett, Jr., 54 T.C. 221 (1970).
54 T.C. 221 (1970).
Id. at 232.
Id. at 230. The court apparently was influenced by the fact that the transaction in
question seemed to have "substance" and the fact that the classification as debt rather than
equity resulted in no improper tax advantage which might "frustrate the purpose of the
taxing statute." See id. at 232.
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The Stinnett analysis of whether the classification as debt rather than
equity might "frustrate the purpose of the taxing statute,"' is a factor
which was lacking in Catalina Homes and Gamman. Catalina Homes did,
however, hint at a tax avoidance consideration but expressed the view that
the use of debt might frustrate the taxing statutes in general." The
Gamman court also hinted at this consideration when in its conclusion it
stated that although it had paid* "lip-service to the thin capitalization
doctrine," it doubted the doctrine's applicability in the Subchapter S con-
text since it could not readily see any tax benefit to be gained by calling
equity debt.86 The Stinnett court chose to base its decision on the fact that
the use of debt in that case in no way frustrated the congressional purpose
of the taxing statute and thus concluded that the regulation was invalid
as applied to the facts of that case." The court did not, however, consider
the further question of whether the thin capitalization doctrine should ever
be applied to reclassify debt in a Subchapter S corporation. Presumably,
if there were an improper tax advantage to be derived from failure to
reclassify, then the doctrine should be applied and the regulation is proper
in so far as it allows that reclassification to be made.
C. Recent Developments
In July, 1972, the Seventh Circuit handed down its decision in Portage
Plastics Co. v. United States.Y This was the first time that the Gamman-
initiated amendment to Regulation 1.1371-1(g) was applied by a court to
reclassify debt as a disqualifying second class of stock. Although the deci-
sion was susequently reversed by the court sitting en banc,1 an analysis
of the initial decision should serve to demonstrate some of the typical
errors made in analyzing the reclassification problem.
The Portgage case involved equal advances by non-stockholders Eliza-
beth Berst and Sarah Garnett in the amount of $12,500. The debt instru-
ments provided for repayment within five years with five per cent interest
to be paid from the corporation's net profit before taxes. Either could be
renewed, at the holder's option, for a second five year period and no provi-
sion was made for repayment in the event of the corporation's default on
"interest" payments, nor was any sinking fund provided to assure timely
retirement of the obligations. In addition, both notes were subordinated to
the rights of other creditors on two separate occasions. 0 The court empha-
sized the high debt to equity ratio and the fact that no distributions were
Id. at 232.
See notes 60-62 and accompanying text supra.
" 46 T.C. at 12.
James L. Stinnett, Jr., 54 T.C. 221, 232 (1970).
470 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd en banc, 73-1 U.S.T.C. 80,511 (7th Cir. 1973).
73-1 U.S.T.C. 80,511 (7th Cir. 1973).
470 F.2d at 310-11.
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made to the common stockholders for the three year period under consider-
ation.9' On the basis of these facts and the overall character of the notes
themelves, the court concluded that the debt obligations were in fact eq-
uity.92
Having reached this conclusion, the court then determined that the
existence of preferential rights over the common stockholders demanded
the application of the regulation. 3 The amended regulation provided that
all reclassified debt would be considered a second class of stock unless it
was held proportionately to the holder's nominal stock interest. Since the
obligations were held by non-stockholders, the court concluded that they
were clearly held disproportionately to the holder's nominal stock inter-
est.94 Thus the application of the -regulation required reclassification as a
second class of stock which resulted in an invalidation of the Subchapter
S election. The majority opinion expressed the view that the regulation was
in keeping with the purpose of the statute which it interpreted as the
"elimination of administrative complexities."' 5 These administrative com-
plexities, it reasoned, were likely to be most serious when there is some
unequal treatment of stockholders created by either preferred stock or
reclassified debt, which gives preferential rights."
Judge Cummings' dissent in Portage points to the failure of the majority
to delve into the underlying purpose of the one class of stock requirement.
He focused on the lack of any tax avoidance motive in the case." Had there
been any improper tax advantage in the use of debt, Cummings suggests
that the proper remedy would be to deny that particular benefit sought,
rather than to deny Subchapter S status altogether." He reasoned that the
congressional desire in promulgating the one class of stock requirement
was the elimination of administrative problems which might arise regard-
ing certain payments of dividends. If the payments are classified as inter-
est by the parties involved, then that problem could never arise. There is,
therefore, no need for the Commissioner to seek to reclassify such pay-
"5 Id. at 311.
92 Id. at 312-15.
0 Id. at 315.
" Id. at 316. The court distinguished the previous cases in which the proportionality rule
of Regulation 1.1371-1(g) had been applied because the purported debt owners in this case
did not own any of the nominal stock. Id.
'5Id. at 315 n.12.
26 Id.
97Id. at 317-18 (dissenting opinion).
IsId. ' To the extent that improper tax avoidance by use of the guise of debt is still possible
in the Subchapter S context, the thin capitalization doctrine remains available to prevent
the abuse. Where on the facts of a particular case the Commissioner shows that the taxpayer
spuriously labeled an advance as debt in order to reap an improper tax benefit, then the
capitalization doctrine serves its intended purpose when it is invoked to deny the particular
benefit wrongfully taken. . . ." Id. at 318.
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ments as dividends rather than interest. 9
Upon reconsideration en banc, the Seventh Circuit incorporated Judge
Cummings' dissent and held that the traditional thin-capitalization doc-
trine tests for determining whether a purported loan should be treated as
an equity contribution in order to prevent improper tax avoidance in other
contexts is not suitable for determining whether a purported loan consti-
tutes a second class of stock in the Subchapter S context.' ® The decision
emphasized the fact that problems involving allocation of income to stock-
holders of different classes will never arise so long as interest payments are
treated as such.'0 ' And again, it emphasized the fact that if the government
is concerned with "nefarious tax avoidance motive[s] in denominating
certain advances as debt,"'' 2 it should attack those improper motives di-
rectly.
The Portgage court's sentiments concerning the desirability of a "direct
attack" are appropriate. The current regulation, however, is an awkward
mechanism to use in guarding against debt abuses in Subehapter S corpo-
rations. The regulation directs the court to make an initial determination
of whether the debt is actually equity, 03 presumably employing the tradi-
tional thin-capitalization analysis. If the court finds that the debt is eq-
uity, then it must determine whether the obligation is a second class of
stock.' 4 Only upon a finding of a second class of stock will termination of
the election be proper.' 5 Presumably, the only guidelines for determining
whether debt, reclassified as equity, constitutes a second class of stock are
contained in the first part of the regulaton which states that varying rights
and interest indicate more than one class of stock."'
The regulation, however, makes no explicit statement regarding the
abuse of debt per se. If debt abuse is the evil to be attacked, it would be
more sensible, as the Portage court suggested, to attack the evil straight-
forwardly rather than to attack it through a cumbersome two-step process,
requiring first, a finding that the purported debt is in fact equity and
second, a finding that the equity is a second class of stock.
It must be borne in mind that there are other remedies besides termina-
" Id. at 321.
Portage Plastics Co. v. United States, 73-1 U.S.T.C. 80,511 (7th Cir. 1973).
, Id. at 80,514. A problem might arise, it is suggested, if income in one year is allocated
on an equal basis among both common and preferred shareholders but is not at that time
distributed to them. If in the following year the preferred shareholders are paid dividends in
excess of current earnings, a situation might arise in which the common shareholders' ordi-
nary gain from the prior year can only be offset by a later capital loss. For a further discussion
of the problem, see p. 222 infra.
"1 73-1 U.S.T.C. at 80,516 (7th Cir. 1973).
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tion which may be employed to correct any abusive use of debt within a
Subchapter S corporation. Logically, the remedy should depend on the
particular abuse and the improper tax benefit sought to be derived. In
some instances it would be possible to correct the abuse merely by denying
the particular benefit sought. If this can be done without affecting the
Subchapter S status of the corporation, there is no reason why termination
should be invoked as an added penalty. In other instances, termination
may be appropriate. For example, debt could be used to receive a capital
contribution from an eleventh shareholder, from a corporation, an alien or
some other source forbidden by the requirements of section 1371(a)(1)-(3).
Beyond these examples of blatant abuse, however, it is difficult to imag-
ine other situations in which debt might be used in a manner which would
warrant termination. Of course, if debt is used to accomplish the very
result that the one class of stock requirement seeks to avoid, termination
through the two-step reclassification process is entirely proper.
Thus there are three possibilities. First, debt may be ued to gain an
improper tax benefit. In such a case, denial of the particular benefit is the
appropriate remedy. Second, debt may be used in such a way as to abuse
the statutory framework of Subchapter S, in which event termination may
be appropriate. Third, debt may constitute the prohibited second class of
stock. Here again, termination of the Subchapter S election may be neces-
sary. In any event, it is only this third possibility that should be covered
by any regulation promulgated under the authority of section 1371(a)(4).
Any regulations intended to deal with the first two possibilities should be
promulgated independently of that section and should not be concerned
with reclassification as a second class of stock.
1II. TAX ADvANTAGES IN MAKING CAPrrAL CoNTRImUTONs IN THE Foius OF
DEBT RATHER THAN EQUITY
A. Debt Used to Gain a Specific Tax Benefit
The major advantage arising from the use of debt in Subchapter C
corporations is that the interest on the debt may be paid to the stockhold-
ers in the form of a disguised dividend-earnings and profits which would
normally be included in the taxable income of the corporation may be
deducted by the corporation as interest payments under section 163. Thus
the double taxation of income is avoided. This tax benefit through the use
of debt is not available to Subchapter S corporations since no tax is im-
posed at the corporate level.
Another widely recognized tax avoidance scheme in this area is income
splitting. 0 7 Debt could be used within a Subchapter S framework to
achieve this purpose. For example, if a family owned corporation is capital-
10 See generally Note, Shareholder Lending and Tax Avoidance in the Subchapter S
Corporation, 67 COLum. L. REV. 495, 518 (1967).
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ized primarily from debt contributions by a high tax bracket family mem-
ber and the other family members contribute only a nominal amount of
capital in return for the corporation's stock, the corporate income would
be allocated only to the shareholders and thus taxed to them at a much
lower rate than if it were allocated to the high tax bracket family member.
In this situation, it might be argued that the debt contribution is in reality
an equity contribution which should be classified as a second class of stock
under the proportionality rule of Regulation 1.1371-1(g). However, if in-
come splitting is the evil sought to be corrected, it can be done without
requiring termination of the Subchapter S election.""5 The Service has
sufficient authority for correcting this evil through reallocation of the in-
come without resort to the thin-capitalization reclassification doctrine.'
If dividends have actually been distributed, the Commissioner could real-
locate the amounts for tax purposes and treat any excess paid out to the
lower tax bracket taxpayer as gifts. If the taxable income has not yet been
distributed, the allocation would merely shift the amounts from one PTI
account to another. Therefore, the government is protected from tax avoid-
ance schemes and the taxpayer is protected from having to pay tax on
income which he does not receive since accurate adjustments of PTI reflect
the right to receive income on which he has already been taxed. Reclassifi-
cation, then, would serve no meaningful purpose for either the taxpayer or
the government.
Thus in these situations involving common and well-recognized schemes
of tax avoidance, it should never be necessary to employ the thin-
incorporation reclassification doctrine to invalidate the scheme when it is
attempted in a Subchapter S context. General tax law will normally pro-
vide an adequate basis for remedying the evil." 0 A problem, however, arises
when a court must decide how to remedy the situation. Suppose the im-
proper tax benefit which is sought to be corrected is so dependent upon
the peculiar operation of the Subchapter S taxing provisions that the bene-
fit is one which could not occur unless Subchapter S status were available.
In such a sitation, would it be proper to make that status unavailable by
reclassifying debt to terminate the Subchapter S election?
B. Debt Used to Abuse the Subchapter S Statutory Scheme
As has been mentioned, debt could be used to create an eleventh
- See M.F. Beirne, 52 T.C. 210 (1969); H.D. Duarte, 44 T.C. 193 (1965).
-" The Service could, for example, attack the arrangement by using section 1375(c) which
allows the Commissioner to apportion corporate earnings among family shareholders to reflect
the value of services rendered. The Service could also rely on the general "assignment of
income" case law which would prohibit such arrangements in the absence of true substanco.
See Note, Assignment of Income, Possibilities Under Subchapter S, 23 TAx. L. REV. 213
(1968).
110 For example, the "form versus substance" doctrine of Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465 (1935) should uniformly serve as authority to invalidate any "sham" uses of debt.
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shareholder, a corporate shareholder, or an alien shareholder. Since Con-
gress deemed it proper to limit the number of shareholders to ten,"' any
increase in shareholders which violates this limitation automatically ter-
minates the election. If an eleventh individual holds an interest in the
corporation similar to that of ten undisputed shareholders except that his
instrument is labelled debt, then a violation of the Subchapter S statutes
exists. Debt has been used to gain the benefit of an eleventh share-
holder-a benefit impermissible within the Subchapter S framework. In
such a case, termination of Subchapter S status may indeed be the appro-
priate remedy.
Some commentators suggest another situation in which debt may be
used to abuse the very scheme of Subchapter S.112 Essentially, it is con-
tended that a benefit may be derived from manipulation of the net operat-
ing loss deduction. Since section 1374(c)(2) limits the availability of this
deduction to an amount not exceeding the shareholder's basis in his stock
and debt, a shareholder might desire to increase his debt basis merely for
the purpose of utilizing the availability of this deduction to the full extent
of his pro rata share of this loss. This use of debt, considered indepen-
dently, results in no improper tax advantage-Congress obviously in-
tended such a benefit to be available to Subchapter S shareholders or it
would not have enacted this provision.
The improper tax advantage is asserted to arise through the combined
effect of section 1376 and section 1232. Section 1376 provides that a share-
holder's basis in both his stock and debt must be reduced to correspond
with the amount of net operating loss he claims as a deduction-the stock
basis being reduced first, then any basis in the debt being reduced. As
pointed out previously, a shareholder may increase his debt basis for the
purpose of taking full advantage of his pro rata share of the loss. In such a
situation, when the shareholder uses the full loss deduction, his basis in
both stock and debt would be reduced to zero. At some point in a
subsequent tax year, the stockholder might withdraw the amount of the
loan from the. corporation in full repayment of the debt. Since the basis of
the debt had been reduced to zero, repayment of the loan would produce
taxable gain; however, section 1232 provides for capital gains treatment in
the event of repayment of corporate indebtedness."' Thus the shareholder
would apparently reap the benefit of an ordinary tax deduction followed
by a gain taxed at the capital gains rate.
The commentators who have emphasized this possibility have failed to
analyze the problem completely. There are two possible situations in which
this "supposed" tax benefit can occur.
' TNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a)(1).
,,! See, e.g., Bravenec, supra note 55, at 255; Caplin, supra note 23, at 193. But see Note,
supra note 107, at 519.
"I See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1232.
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1. The True Loan.-The shareholder loan may serve not only to facili-
tate the shareholder in taking advantage of the loss deduction, but also to
benefit the corporation by providing necessary working capital at a time
when business losses may have reduced its liquid assets. In this situation,
the loan has a true business purpose. In all probability, the loan will not
be repaid immediately unless the corporation has immediate profits. Such
a loan is, then, at the risk of the business. If the corporation does make an
immediate profit and does repay the loan, the shareholders will recognize
a gain taxed only at the capital rate; however, despite the fact of the prior
deduction at the ordinary rate, recognition upon repayment does not bene-
fit the shareholder.
The loan is capable of being repaid because the corporation has made a
profit. The profit, however, has produced taxable income. The shareholder
will pay tax at ordinary rates on his share of that taxable income. If it is
not distributed to him, the amount of his share of UTI will increase his
stock basis, but not his debt basis. The result is that if the corporation then
repays the shareholder loan, which because of the prior loss deduction has
a reduced basis of zero, the shareholder will have to pay a capital gains
tax on the full amount."' Rcognition of such gain at that time is in fact
artificial and works to the advantage of the government rather than the
taxpayer because he is being repaid from earnings and profits on which he
has already paid tax at the ordinary rate.
An example might serve to clarify this point. Assume Corporation X,
which is owned by A and B in equal shares, has a net operating loss for
1971 in the amount of $100,000. Each shareholder would be entitled to a
$50,000 deduction on the basis of his pro rata share of that loss. However,
if each had only a $20,000 stock basis and no current debt basis, he would
not be able to take full advantage of the deduction."' In order to take full
advantage of the loss deduction and to provide the corporation with the
needed working capital, assume that shareholder A lends the corporation
$30,000. Then, assume that in 1972, Corporation X makes a profit of
$100,000. This $100,000, less the $30,000 which is used to repay A, is re-
tained by the corporation. Thus in 1972, A must report $50,000 of ordinary
income which is his pro rata share of UTI. In addition, he must report
$30,000 capital gain on the repayment of the loan.
The $50,000 ordinary income which A reported would increase his stock
basis from zero to $50,000 and would also increase his PTI account by
"I This, of course, assumes that the debt was evidenced by a note as required by section
1232.
1 In a Subchapter S corporation, $40,000 will represent the entire amount of capital sinco
it represents not only the original capital contribution but also the amount of any profits
retained by the corporation. Since a shareholder's stock basis is increased by his share of UTI,
the stock basis necessarily includes that amount of retained profits which were taxable in-
come in prior years.
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$50,000.16 One might argue that, after all, he is not harmed by having to
report a $30,000 gain upon repayment since he still has $50,000 available
for tax-free withdrawal out of PTLII 7 But this is not the case. Not only is
the basis in stock and debt reduced by the amount of any loss deduction
taken but PTI is also reduced by that deduction."' Furthermore, PTI may
be a negative amount.' Thus in the above example, for the years 1971-
72, shareholder A has reported an ordinary deduction of $50,000, a capital
gain of $30,000, and an ordinary gain of $50,000.
Assume A's PTI account in 1971 had a zero balance. In that case the
ordinary deduction would create a new balance of negative $50,000. The
subsequent ordinary gain, represented by A's pro rata share of UTI, would
increase this account, bringing the balance back to zero. The $100,000
profit in 1972 should have the effect of wiping out the $100,000 loss in-
curred in 1971. It should have the further effect of restoring the status quo
completely for all who were financially affected by the loss. A's ordinary
loss, for example, is offset by his subsequent ordinary gain. The loss is
reflected by a reduction in his PTI account which is also offset by a subse-
quent increase in the PTI account. A's stock basis is reduced to zero by
virtue of the loss, as is his debt basis. However, at this point the subse-
quent profit fails to reestablish the status quo. A's stock basis is increased,
but his debt basis remains zero. Whether the Congress intentionally pro-
vided for this result in its enactment of section 1376 is unclear, but the
effect is to work a hardship on A when his loan is repaid since he must
recognize an immediate gain upon repayment.
However, A does have an inherent unrealized capital loss which could
eventually offset this immediate capital gain. The basis in his stock is now
$50,000. Prior to the tax events of 1971 and 1972, that basis was $20,000.
Assume that in 1971 A's stock basis was exactly equal to the value of his
stock-i.e., the corporation's net assets being worth $40,000. A's fifty per
cent interest was, then, worth $20,000. The loss of $100,000 on the part of
the corporation, followed by a profit of $100,000 should, in simple theory,
make the corporation's net worth exactly equal to $40,000, the value of its
net assets prior to the 1971 loss and 1972 profit. The value of A's stock,
then, would be $20,000. Yet because of the operation of section 1376, the
stock has a basis of $50,'000. The result is that A has an unrealized capital
loss of $30,000 capital gain which he was forced to recognize upon repay-
ment of the loan. Ths loss, however, will not be realized until such time
as A disposes of his stock.
"I The stock basis had been reduced to zero when shareholder A took the full loss deduction
in 1971.
U" Since the PTI account may be destroyed by a subsequent stock transfer in complete
termination of interest, the taxpayer may never benefit from the mere existence of this
account.
- See Tress. Reg. 9 1.1375-4(d)(2)(i) (1962).
-' See N.Y.U. 27th INsT. ON FED. TAx 764 (1969).
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The commentators who suggest a possible tax benefit exists by virtue of
the fact that section 1376 only increases a shareholder's basis in his stock
have failed to consider the economic reality of the situation. If the loan is
repaid from earnings and profits or is repaid at a time when earnings and
profits are imminent, then in light of the above discussion, it should be
clear that there is in fact no improper tax benefit to be derived from the
use of debt. In fact, had A used stock rather than debt to increase his
investment in the corporation, he might have been able to avoid immedi-
ate recognition upon repayment. His stock basis would have been in-
creased by the subsequent earnings and profits. He then could have re-
deemed stock in order to recoup the $30,000 at no gain.'
2. The "Sham" Loan.-There is, however, another possible factual
situation in which the use of debt for the purpose of utilizing the full
amount of an operating loss may result in an unfair tax advantage. For
example, Corpoation X may have borrowed heavily from outside sources
during 1971 so that in spite of the existence of the $100,000 loss in that
year, the corporation has sufficient working capital available for the be-
ginning of business in 1972. In such a situation, Shareholder A might lend
the corporation $30,000 solely for the purpose of taking full advantage of
his pro rata share of the loss. Six months later, the corporation is still doing
badly. Yet A's loan is repaid, probably from funds which are owed to third
parties. If earnings and profits are forthcoming, the economic situation will
balance out as indicated in the preceding example. If they are not, the
repayment of A's loan may present several problems totally unrelated to
tax law.
Ignoring these collateral problems and analyzing the theory behind the
availability of the loss deduction, one can consider the proper treatment
of A's loan without taking into account the debt versus equity reclassifica-
tion problem. Congress' evident intent was to allow the loss deduction up
to the amount a shareholder has invested in the corporation, whether such
investment be in the form of stock or debt. But the loan transaction must
have some substance in order to justify its being used as a basis for the
deduction. In the previous example, the shareholder is attempting to use
a sham loan transaction to derive the benefit of an ordinary deduction. It
might be said that he is using debt rather than equity to accomplish this
purpose, since debt has the advantage of being more easily withdrawn than
equity contributions. There are, it seems, two possibilities. If the loan is a
sham, then the first benefit, the availability of the loss deduction, could
be denied; or, since the fact is that debt has been misused in place of
equity, perhaps it is the second benefit, the ease of withdrawal, which
should be removed. At any rate, even in this second example where there
is a possible improper tax benefit, it is not necessary to terminate the
- For a further discussion of the possible consequences of stock redemptions in such a
situation, see Bravenec, supra note 55, at 251.
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Subchapter S election altogether in order to eliminate the impropriety.
In general, termination of Subchapter S election should not be used to
punish a taxpayer for his improper use of debt if the impropriety can be
remedied by some other method. Specifically, termination should not
occur as the result of an artificial reclassification of debt as a prohibited
second class of stock. Such a reclassification is proper only if debt is ac-
tually used to accomplish that which is prohibited by the one class of stock
requirement.
IV. TBE PossIBMrrY OF UsING DEBT ro TwAr THE CONGRESSIONAL PUR-
POSE OF SECTION 1371(a)(4)
Section 1371(a)4) does nothing more than prohibit the use of a second
class of stock in Subchapter S corporations. Debt is not specifically men-
tioned. Thus there is no statutory prohibition against creating a debt in-
strument which grants preferential rights similar to rights which might be
granted by the creation of a second class of stock. It is not the preferential
rights in and of themselves which are prohibited. Rather, the statutory
prohibition is aimed at eliminating certain complexities which might occur
if such rights were coupled with an equity interest. Only if the debt interest
creates the types of complexities which the statute seeks to avoid, should
the debt be reclassified as a disqualifying second class of stock. That is,
reclassification, followed by termination, is proper only if the effect of the
debt contribution is to thwart the congressional purpose behind the one
class of stock requirement.
A. Congressional Purpose in the One Class of Stock Requirement
When Subchapter S was enacted in 1958, there were no indications in
the Committee Reports as to the rationale behind the one class of stock
requirement. The Senate Report, however, does set forth the basic congres-
sional intent, stating that the statute is meant to allow certain small busi-
nesses "to select the form of business organization desired, without the
necessity of taking into account major differences in tax consequences."''
The only direct comment on the one class of stock requirement comes
from earlier committee hearings on proposals similar to those which were
finally enacted as Subchapter S. The Treasury Department conducted two
major studies on this type of optional taxation method for small business
corporations as early as 1946 and 1947.2 Both these studies were reviewed
by congressional committees. ' The one class of stock limitation was felt
.21 S. Rm. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958).
12 Div. of Tax Research, U.S. Treas. Dept., The Postwar Corp. Tax Structure (1946); Div.
of Tax Research, U.S. Treas. Dept., Taxation of Small Business (1947).
'1%Hearings on Community Property & Family Partnerships and on Corp. Tax Problems
& Gen. Revisions before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 80th Cong., Ist Sees., pt. 1, at
1136-81 & pt. 5, at 3739, 3757-62 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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to be necessary so that each shareholder would have equal control over any
retained earnings which had been taxed to him previously. Furthermore,
it was feared that allowance of more than one class of stock might present
administrative problems relating to allocation of earnings:
For example, profits retained in one year in excess of accumulated
claims of preferred stockholders would presumably be allocated to
holders of common stock. Yet in a later year these funds might be
used to pay dividends on preferred stock. Correction of this situation
would -require reopening returns or adjusting current year's income
for all stockholders of the earlier year.''
This same concern was later expressed in the Senate Report on a 1954
proposal which was the forerunner of Subchapter S:'I
In order to avoid possible complications in the taxation of preferred
stock dividends not earned in the year distributed, only corporations
having one class of stock outstanding may qualify.' 6
If this requirement were not made, undistributed current earnings
could not be taxed to the shareholders without great complications.
In a year when preferred stock dividends were paid in an amount
exceeding the corporation's current earnings, it would be possible for
preferred shareholders to receive income previously taxed to common
shareholders, and the same earnings would be taxed twice unless a
deduction for the earnings previously taxed were allowed to the com-
mon shareholders. Such an adjustment, however, would be extremely
difficult where there had been a transfer of common stock in the
interim.2 1
Absent any further indications from Congress as to the reasons for this
requirement, the conclusion from the foregoing would seem to be that a
major concern behind the one class of stock requirement was to reduce
administrative problems. The concern focuses on the problem of allocating
present UTI for the determination of present tax liability. Different classes
of stock might create different rights in relation to the later distribution
of that UTI. The problem seems to be ultimately a question of whether it
is equitable to tax a shareholder on income which may ultimately be dis-
tributed to someone else. The foregoing quotations seem to assume that it
is not, and, on the basis of that assumption, to conclude that to make
adjustments either prior or subsequent to such an inequitable occurrence
would create severe administrative complications.
121 Hearings at 1155.
'1 This proposal would have provided complete partnership tax treatment to a qualifying
corporation. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1954).
,', Id. at 119.
'2 Id. at 453-54.
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The question of whether such assumptions or conclusions are warranted
in light of the tax structure of Subchapter S is beyond the scope of this
Note.12 However, summarizing the purpose as one aimed at avoidance of
the type of inequitable results suggested in the above quotations, the fol-
lowing section will discuss the possibility of thwarting this purpose through
the use of debt.
B. Is Reclassification Ever Proper in the Subchapter S Context?
It has been suggested that there are situations in which the use of debt
should warrant termination of Subchapter S status;'2 it has also been
suggested that no such situations exist.13 The Internal Revenue Service's
position at the moment is unknown. On July 27, 1973, the Service issued
T.I.R. No. 124831 which in effect suspended all litigation in this area pend-
ing a revision of Regulation 1.1371-1(g). Presumably, the government may
still be working on the theory that reclassification of debt has a legitimate
place in the Subchapter S context. The remainder of this Note will be
directed to the basic issue of whether reclassification is ever proper in the
Subchapter S context.
In suggesting that reclassification might be proper, the Fifth Circuit in
Amory Cotton Oil Co. v. United States' suggested three factors for consid-
eration: (1) the general purpose of Subchapter S; (2) the fact that Sub-
chapter S envisions stockholder loans; and (3) whether the particular use
of debt serves a purpose within the contemplation of Subchapter S.' To
this list should be added a fourth factor: whether the particular use of debt
thwarts the purpose of section 1371(a)(4). Moreover, if reclassification is
to result in termination of the Subchapter S status, then it is this fourth
factor which should be of greatest significance.
"I More than likely, under the current tax structure, the type of inequities which seemed
to concern Congress would simply not occur, except to a slight extent. For instance, so long
as a common shareholder's PTI account is not reduced, he theoretically retains the right to a
later tax-free distribution in that amount. If distributions are made to preferred shareholders
which do not come from current earnings and profits or accumulated earnings and profits,
presumably they could represent a return of basis, with any excess over basis being treated
as capital gain under the provisions of section 301. Of course, the actual source of funds so
distributed may be retained earnings which are represented by the PTI accounts. This might
result in the lack of actual funds which can be distributed to the common shareholders in
satisfaction of their PTI accounts. The result will be a loss in actual value of the common
stock-a loss which will not be recognized until the stock is ultimately disposed of. Of course
it is possible that the loss may be a capital one wvhereas the shareholder has been paying tax
on ordinary gains, a seemingly inequitable exchange. If the stock is section 1244 stock, how-
ever, (and there is no reason why it should not be), the loss will be an ordinary one.
'2 See, e.g., Bravenec, supra note 55, at 255; Caplin, supra note 23, at 193.
1 See Note, supra note 107, at 519.
' 7 CCH 1973 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 6754.
'" 468 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1051-52.
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The main problem with which Congress seemed to be concerned was the
problem of "PTI leakage"-i.e., it might be possible for common stock-
holders to pay tax on income, build up a PTI account, and yet never reap
the benefits of the PTI account if corporate funds are subsequently distrib-
uted to preferred shareholders.
Although this type of "PTI leakage" may occur to a limited extent if
preferred stock exists, this does not mean it will occur if debt is used
instead. It certainly cannot occur in situations in which interest is paid out
of current earnings. Funds to support the PTI account, which represents
prior earings, will not be affected by any payments made out of current
earnings.
If interest payments are made in the absence of current earnings, the
effect will be the creation of a net operating loss. If the stockholdings have
remained constant, the shareholder is not harmed by this type of interest
payment in that the net operating loss will be passed on to the shareholders
as an ordinary deduction to the extent of their adjusted bases in stock and
debt. Thus a shareholder in such a situation would be fully compensated
for any PTI he did not directly receive, since that PTI would be matched
by the net operating loss deduction.
When there has been a partial transfer of a stockholder's interest after
PTI has accumulated; however, the problem of PTI leakage appears to
have more substance. This results from the fact that a shareholder's share
of PTI may no longer be proportionate to his share in any net operating
loss deduction that may become available through the payment of interest.
This situation occurs because the regulations provide that a shareholder's
PTI is not reduced by a sale of stock unless the sale is a complete termina-
tion of interest.Iu This excess PTI, reflecting prior earnings on stock which
the shareholder no longer owns, appears to be subject to leakage since, not
reflecting the shareholder's present stock basis, it represents an amount
which cannot be employed in utilization of the net operating loss deduc-
tion.
However, even though the possibility of leakage exists, it may not repre-
sent an inequity of the type that concerned Congress. Since a shareholder's
basis in his stock is increased by each addition to PTI, when he sells part
of his stock, that share of PTI attributable to the stock sold is presumably
accounted for in the sale. Of course, were he to sell the stock for less than
its basis, he might have only a capital loss to offset the ordinary gain he
had reported earlier.
Another type of inequity might be caused by the use of debt which
resembles something like preferred stock. Consider the following example:
Corporation AB needs more capital. X, a non-shareholder, lends the corpo-
ration $10,000 on the following terms: interest is to be five percent of the
'3 Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(d) (1962).
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corporation's net profits, payments to begin on a date three years hence, a
minimum of $1,000 annually to be guaranteed; no distributions can be
made to common stockholders until this interest is paid; the note is paya-
ble on demand only after a ten year period; and, the corporation may not
repay it before that time.
It is apparent that such an instrument creates substantial and immedi-
ate rights in X to the future corporate profits. However, since he is not a
shareholder, none of the income in the first three years will be taxed to
him. The instrument in reality is a very preferential second class of stock.
Furthermore, failure to reclassify it as such gives rise to a possible inequity
to the common shareholders. They are bearing the tax burden of current
profits which they must leave in the corporation. The retention of these
profits presumably will work to increase later profits, in which X will share.
However, if X's debt is reclassified as stock in order to allocate a percen-
tage of present corporate income, it will result in the same type of complex-
ity that section 1371(a) (4) seeks to avoid and for which the regulations do
not provide. Because of the specific provisions accompanying X's obliga-
tion, it would be extremely difficult to allocate to him the amount of
present tax burden he should bear. His eventual participation in corporate
profits may amount to only five percent. But, assuming low profits, the
$1,000 guarantee may amount to more than five percent.
Perhaps this is a situation where denial of Subchapter S status is the
proper remedy. Admittedly such a situation would be rare. And in this
case, since the inequity is one to the common shareholders, it is unlikely
that the Commissioner would concern himself with reclassification-
unless of course the reclassification also resulted in a tax benefit to the
government.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether or not a situation such as the one described above is likely to
occur is not the main focus of this Note. It is sufficient to recognize that
there is a possibility, however slight, that a situation may occur in which
reclassification of debt should result in denial of Subchapter S status.
Hopefully, this Note provides guidelines for determining whether such a
situation does in fact exist. The specific type of tax avoidance in-
volved-not tax avoidance in general-must be considered. Finally, to
terminate the election pursuant to section 1371(a)(4), the debt instrument
must create the particular type of inequity that the one class of stock
requirement seeks to avoid.
The proposed regulation should be based on a sound consideration of
this fact. One commentator has suggested the following rule:
Obligations that purport to represent debt but which actually repre-
sent equity capital will not generally constitute a second class of
stock. If the principal purpose of the use of purported debt obligations
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is the avoidance or evasion of tax, however, such obligations may be
deemed a second class of stock, but only if the avoidance or evasion
of tax cannot be otherwise remedied. 35
Although such a rule is indeed preferable to the regulation as it now
stands, such a rule cannot be based on the authority of section 1371(a)(4).
That section is not concerned with the avoidance or evasion of tax in
general. It is only concerned with tax consequences of a certain type. Tax
avoidance or evasion in general should be dealt with directly rather than
through an indirect and artificial reclassification which culminates in ter-
mination pursuant to section 1371(a)(4). Instead, the proposed regulation
should provide for reclassification only in cases in which the use of debt
hinders fair and accurate allocation of current income.
Patricia A. Cain
'1 Comment, Debt as a Second Class of Stock in Subchapter S Corporations, 51 TEx. L.
Rav. 531 (1973).
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